Has Texas Really Fixed Its Grid? Winter Storm Lessons, Natural Gas Failures, and What’s Different in 2026

As another major winter storm spreads damaging ice and extreme cold across the South, Texans are asking a familiar question: has the state really fixed its electric grid since the February 2021 Texas winter storm and power crisis or are we one deep freeze away from a repeat. ERCOT says it “anticipates there will be sufficient generation to meet demand” this winter, but the system still leans heavily on natural gas – the same fuel that failed first and worst in February 2021.

We will walk you through what actually broke in 2021, the central role of natural gas shortages, what’s changed since then, and how to interpret ERCOT’s “we’re ready” messaging during the current ice storm.

What Went Wrong in 2021: The Worst Grid Failure in Texas History

During the February 2021 Texas winter storm, a multi‑day Arctic outbreak drove temperatures far below normal across Texas and much of the central United States. Demand for electricity and heat surged as temperatures plunged and stayed low for more than 100 hours, while generation across all fuel types underperformed. At the peak of the crisis, more than 4.5 million homes and businesses lost power, outages lasted an average of about 46 hours, and economic damages are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars with well over a hundred confirmed deaths.

ERCOT had forecast an “extreme” winter peak demand around 67 gigawatts, but actual load climbed to nearly 70 gigawatts as the storm settled in, even as generation tripped offline. To avoid a complete collapse of the grid that could have taken weeks or months to restore, ERCOT ordered massive, rapid load shedding – controlled outages that turned into days‑long blackouts in many communities.

For North Texas residents, the February 2021 storm sits alongside other recent extremes in regional weather history. Our DFW weather records and trends page shows how rare but intense cold, heat, and winter storms have stressed infrastructure over the last several decades.

 

Natural Gas: The Backbone That Failed First

In winter, Texas is a gas‑dominated grid: natural gas plants carry most of the electricity load and natural gas also directly heats many homes and buildings. The 2021 storm exposed how fragile that dependency becomes when the gas system itself is not built for sustained Arctic conditions.

Gas‑fired generation dominated the outages

A joint investigation by federal and regional regulators found that natural gas‑fired units represented about 58% of all generating units that experienced unplanned outages, derates, or failures to start during the February 2021 freeze. Across the ERCOT system, roughly 34,000 megawatts of capacity were offline at times – nearly half of peak winter demand – and a majority of those losses came from gas‑fired plants. Analyses suggest that gas plant failures alone accounted for on the order of 15 gigawatts of lost output at the onset of the storm, far more than the shortfall from wind or solar.

Gas production and fuel supply collapsed in the cold

The failures weren’t limited to the power plants. The entire natural gas supply chain was hit by the cold. Wellheads, gathering lines, and processing facilities in key producing regions like the Permian Basin froze or shut down, and some sites lost the electricity needed to run pumps and compressors. Public data indicate that natural gas production in Texas dropped by roughly 45% during the event compared with pre‑storm levels, pushing pipeline pressures below the thresholds many power plants require.

Regulators’ preliminary findings show that about 87% of fuel‑related outages and derates were tied to natural gas supply issues, not coal or oil. In other words, as the storm intensified, there simply was not enough gas reaching plants to sustain output, even aside from frozen plant‑level equipment.

The gas–electric feedback loop made things worse

The Texas grid and gas system are tightly interdependent. When ERCOT ordered utilities to cut load to save the grid, some of the circuits turned off were feeding natural gas production, processing, storage, and pipeline compression facilities. With power cut, those gas facilities could not operate, which further reduced gas deliveries to power plants, forcing more generators offline and requiring more load shedding. Multiple after‑action reports flag this feedback loop as a key reason the event cascaded so quickly from “tight conditions” to a near‑collapse.

Public debate initially focused on frozen wind turbines, but ERCOT’s own data and independent analysis are clear: gas generation and gas supply problems were the dominant cause of the 2021 outages, with under‑performing renewables playing a secondary role.

All Fuels Failed, But Gas Was the Biggest Piece of the Puzzle

While natural gas was the largest single contributor to outages, other resources also failed in February 2021. Coal plants struggled with frozen coal piles and equipment issues, at least one nuclear unit tripped offline due to weather‑related failures, and some wind and solar output dropped because of icing and low sunlight.

The Texas Comptroller’s summary of the storm notes that it “was not the most severe” in state history, but it produced the largest loss of electricity because multiple resource types failed at once while ERCOT underestimated peak demand by nearly 14%. A study of cascading risks framed the 2021 event as a textbook example of how correlated failures across infrastructure – power generation, gas supply, water systems – can turn a severe weather event into a broad societal crisis. For a broader view of how often U.S. cities encounter “compound extremes,” see our piece on U.S. cities with the most extreme weather.

Policy Response: SB 3, Weatherization Rules, and Billions in Upgrades

In the aftermath of the February 2021 Texas winter storm, lawmakers and regulators moved to address the most obvious problems. The centerpiece is Senate Bill 3, often called the “winterization bill.”

Senate Bill 3 and grid governance changes

• SB 3 requires critical electric and natural gas facilities – generators, transmission providers, key gas wells, processing plants, and storage sites – to weatherize for extreme conditions and allows fines up to $1 million per day per violation.
• The law directs regulators to create a critical infrastructure supply chain map so that gas facilities feeding the grid are tagged as priority load and less likely to be shut off during emergencies.
• Companion legislation (SB 2) restructured ERCOT’s board, increased state oversight, and gave the Public Utility Commission more authority over grid reliability standards.

Analyses of post‑storm spending estimate that Texas has allocated more than $10 billion toward grid upgrades, weatherization, backup power for critical facilities, and related resilience measures. Programs like these mirror the kind of layered resilience we talk about in our disasters and fiscal readiness coverage, which emphasizes both physical and financial preparation.

ERCOT’s winter readiness rules and inspections

ERCOT and the PUC adopted new Weather Emergency Preparedness Rules in phases, requiring generators and transmission owners to implement minimum cold‑weather protections and submit readiness reports. These rules cover heat tracing for instrumentation, insulation of exposed piping, windbreaks, and procedures for maintaining equipment during extended cold.

ERCOT’s public winter 2025–2026 overview states that, under expected weather conditions, the organization “anticipates there will be sufficient generation to meet demand this winter” and emphasizes closer coordination with generators, transmission utilities, and regulators.

Natural gas weatherization and storage

The Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC), which regulates oil and gas, was tasked with designating “critical” gas facilities and inspecting them for winter readiness. By late 2025, RRC reported thousands of weatherization inspections of gas infrastructure during the 2024 and 2025 winter seasons, with very few formal violations issued. The state also entered recent winters with roughly 500–525 billion cubic feet of working gas in underground storage – the highest levels in decades – providing an important buffer when production dips during cold snaps.

However, a 2025 state audit found significant weaknesses in how gas winterization is enforced. Auditors concluded that inspectors often accepted whatever measures companies chose to implement, without validating performance against best‑practice standards, and that only two violations were issued across thousands of inspections. Watchdog groups argue this leaves room for “cheapest possible” fixes that may not hold up in rare but severe cold events.

Is the Texas Grid Really Ready Now? What’s Different in 2026

So, heading into this latest ice and cold event, is Texas actually better prepared – or just hoping for milder conditions? The most honest answer is: the grid is more resilient than it was in 2011 or in February 2021, but it is not immune to another extreme, multi‑day deep freeze.

Concrete improvements since 2021

Several tangible changes make a repeat of the 2021 crisis less likely under similar meteorological conditions:

• More weatherized power plants and gas infrastructure: New standards and inspections have pushed many generators and gas facilities to add physical protections against freezing.
• Better critical‑load identification: Mapping and tagging of gas infrastructure are intended to keep power flowing to key production and compression facilities when ERCOT orders load shed.
• Higher gas storage heading into winter: Filling underground storage closer to capacity gives operators more flexibility to keep power plants fueled when production falters.
• Improved operating procedures: ERCOT and national reliability organizations have refined cold‑weather standards and emphasize earlier conservation calls, more realistic winter demand forecasts, and better coordination when multiple regions face cold at the same time.

ERCOT officials have publicly stated before the current storm that the grid is ready and that they expect to meet demand under the forecast scenario, while still acknowledging that extreme, unforecast deviations can introduce risk. For detailed meteorological context on how this winter storm compares with other historic Arctic outbreaks, see our national analysis of November 2025 freeze records and cold extremes.

Remaining vulnerabilities and elevated risk factors

At the same time, independent experts and policy groups argue that the grid still faces systemic vulnerabilities in extreme winter conditions.

• Natural gas is still the dominant fuel: ERCOT remains highly dependent on gas for winter capacity, and recent winter reliability assessments warn that performance of gas production and supply infrastructure will have a “significant effect” on reliability during peak cold.
• Uneven gas winterization enforcement: The state audit of RRC found that many operators determine their own winterization measures and that inspections rarely identify or correct weaknesses, raising concerns that some segments of the gas system remain fragile.
• Rising winter demand: Winter electricity demand is rising, partly due to population growth and expanding data center loads, increasing the stress on generation fleets during cold snaps.
• Transmission and distribution exposure: Ice storms can damage lines and transformers even when generation is adequate, creating localized outages that last for days, especially in heavily treed urban and suburban corridors.

Recent analysis concludes that, while reforms have reduced the chances of another crisis on the scale of February 2021, a rare, prolonged polar outbreak combined with fuel issues could still necessitate significant load shedding. In other words, Texas has moved from “highly fragile” toward “conditionally reliable,” but the margin for error remains thin in the worst‑case scenarios.

Natural Gas and Home Heating: Why Gas Furnaces Aren’t a Guaranteed Backu

Many Texans assume that a natural gas furnace or gas fireplace insulates them from grid problems, but the 2021 experience showed the limitations of that assumption.

• Electric components: Modern gas furnaces use electric blowers, ignition controls, and thermostats. If the grid goes down, those systems can’t run even if gas pressure is adequate.
• Gas system dependence on power: Parts of the gas distribution network – compressors, control systems, even some valves – rely on electricity. If critical feeders to those facilities are shed, local gas pressure can fall, limiting both grid fuel and direct heating.
• Gas vs. power competition: During extreme events, both power plants and end‑use customers are competing for limited gas supply. Ensuring enough fuel for both sectors under stress remains a planning challenge regulators are still grappling with.

For households, the practical takeaway is to treat both electricity and gas as potentially stressed in a severe winter storm and to plan for at least short‑duration outages of one or both systems. Our broader disaster preparedness and fiscal readiness resources cover how to build layered resilience against this kind of dual‑threat event.

How to Monitor the Texas Grid During a Winter Storm

For residents, the most useful real‑time tool is ERCOT’s public dashboard, which provides current demand, available generation, and a color‑coded snapshot of system conditions.

Status	Color	Meaning	What You Should Do
Normal	Green	Sufficient generation to meet demand	Monitor conditions; basic preparedness
Conservation	Yellow	System under strain; reserves tightening	Reduce non‑essential usage, pre‑charge devices
Emergency Level 1	Orange	Operating reserves low; risk of controlled outages	Heavily conserve; prepare for potential short outages
Emergency Level 2	Red	Further reserve depletion; some industrial load curtailed	Be ready for residential outages; finalize supplies
Emergency Level 3	Black	Rotating outages deployed to protect the grid	Follow local guidance; implement outage plans

ERCOT’s winter page consolidates these dashboards and provides updates when energy emergencies are declared, while local utilities share more granular outage maps and restoration estimates.

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Note on storm naming: In this article, we refer to the event as “the February 2021 Texas winter storm” or “the 2021 Texas winter power crisis.” Television outlets such as The Weather Channel sometimes assign names like “Uri” to winter storms, but these names are not used or recognized by NOAA, the National Weather Service, most operational meteorologists, or in formal regulatory and academic reports.

Bottom Line: Stronger Than 2021, Still Dependent on Gas

Texas has not stood still since the February 2021 Texas winter storm. Lawmakers, ERCOT, the PUC, and the Railroad Commission have pushed through major weatherization mandates, inspections, governance changes, and infrastructure spending, and storage levels and operating practices are markedly improved compared with the period before 2011 and 2021.

At the same time, natural gas remains the backbone of the ERCOT winter grid and also its biggest vulnerability: if gas production and delivery fail in a long, statewide Arctic outbreak, no amount of incremental weatherization can fully eliminate the risk of load shedding. For the current storm, forecasts and official statements suggest a serious but manageable event, provided gas infrastructure performs close to expectations and the cold does not exceed current projections.

For Texans on the ground, the most pragmatic approach is twofold: treat ERCOT’s reassurances as credible but conditional, and prepare your household as if localized outages are still possible. The grid is better, but the weather – and the gas system – still get a vote.